



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Commissioner for Patents
United States Patent and Trademark Office
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
DOW 2A-05

CANTOR COLBURN, LLP
55 GRIFFIN ROAD SOUTH
BLOOMFIELD CT 06002

COPY MAILED

AUG 01 2005

OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of :
Borst et al. :
Application No. 10/638,094 : ON PETITION
Filed: 7 August, 2003 :
Attorney Docket No. 128834-2 :

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), filed on 23 June, 2005, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition is **DISMISSED**.

Any request for reconsideration of this decision must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)" or "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b)." This is not a final agency decision.

This application became abandoned on 11 May, 2005, for failure to timely submit the issue and publication fee in response to the Notice of Allowance and Fee(s) Due mailed on 10 February, 2005, which set a three (3) month statutory period for reply. On 1 April, 2005, petitioners attempted to file a Request for Continued Examination, but the request was not accompanied by the proper fee. Petitioners were notified on 20 June, 2005, that the RCE was improper.

Petitioners assert that the delay was unavoidable due to an error with regards to the deposit account. Specifically, petitioners state that after the RCE transmittal form, which authorized the RCE fee to be charged to Deposit Account No. 07-0862 was filed, counsel learned that "the deposit account was no longer to be used and fees were to be paid by credit card." Petitioners further aver that a clerical error occurred on the part of

counsel's secretary, Colleen Brennan, in that she did not maintain sufficient funds in the deposit account.

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by:

- (1) the required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In a nonprovisional application filed on or after June 8, 1995, and abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may also be met by the filing of a request for continued examination in compliance with § 1.114. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof;
- (2) the petition fee as set forth in § 1.17(1);
- (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unavoidable; and
- (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in § 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.

This petition lacks items (1) and (3), above.

In regards to item (1), as the application has become abandoned for failure to pay the issue fee, the issue fee must be paid as a condition of reviving the application. As stated in 37 CFR 1.137(a)(1) in an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof. Therefore the issue fee must be submitted with any renewed petition.

Petitioner is advised that the issue fee paid in the present application cannot be refunded. However, if the application is allowed again, petitioner may request that the issue fee be applied towards the issue fee required by the new Notice of Allowance.¹

¹ The request to apply the issue fee to the new Notice of Allowance must be made in writing and should be accompanied by the new Issue Fee Transmittal Form (PTOL-85(b)),

In regards to item (3), decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of "unavoidable" delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was unavoidable:

The word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.²

The showing of record is inadequate to establish unavoidable delay within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(a). Specifically, an application is "unavoidably" abandoned only where petitioner, or counsel for petitioner, takes all action necessary for a proper response to the outstanding Office action, but through the intervention of unforeseen circumstances, such as failure or mail, telegraph, telefacsimile, or the negligence of otherwise reliable employees, the response is not timely received in the Office.³

Petitioners' arguments have been considered, but are not persuasive. With regard to petitioners' apparent contention that the application was unavoidably abandoned due to a clerical error, this point is not well taken because petitioner's registered patent attorney signed the RCE transmittal form. As such, it was incumbent on petitioners' counsel to ensure that sufficient funds were in the deposit account listed on the RCE

along with a copy of this decision. Additionally, if the issue fee has increased from the previously paid issue fee, the balance due at the time of payment must be submitted. **Failure to timely request in writing that the previously paid issue fee be applied towards the new Notice of Allowance and payment of any balance due will result in the abandonment of the application.**

² In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). In addition, decisions on revival are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account."

³ Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31 (Comm'r Pat. 1887).

transmittal prior to submitting the RCE Transmittal form. An amount sufficient to cover all fees, services, copies, etc., requested must always be on deposit.⁴ Moreover, petitioners state that "[s]hortly after the submission of the RCE and IDS Applicants' attorneys were notified ... that the deposit account was no longer to be used." There is no showing that any action was taken, however, to provide the correct fee information for the RCE request until the filing of the present petition.

While petitioners are correct that a clerical error may constitute unavoidable delay, the error in this case is a mistake by counsel himself rather than a clerical error by a reliable and trusted employee. Mistakes by an attorney, unlike those of an employee of counsel, are not a source of unavoidable error.

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office must rely on the actions or inactions of duly authorized and voluntarily chosen representatives of the applicant, and applicant is bound by the consequences of those actions or inactions.⁵ Specifically, petitioner's delay caused by the mistakes or negligence of his voluntarily chosen representative does not constitute unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 133.⁶

A delay resulting from the lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice or the MPEP does not constitute an "unavoidable" delay.⁷ A delay caused by an applicant's lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice or the MPEP is not rendered "unavoidable" due to: (1) the applicant's reliance upon oral advice from Office employees; or (2) the Office's failure to advise the applicant of any deficiency in sufficient time to permit the applicant to take corrective action.⁸

In summary, the showing of record is that the abandonment resulted from a mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to timely file a reply rather than as a result of

⁴ 37 CFR 1.25(a).

⁵ Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962).

⁶ Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316-17, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1131-32 (N. D. Ind. 1987); Smith v. Diamond, 209 USPQ 1091 (D.D.C. 1981); Potter v. Dann, 201 USPQ 574 (D.D.C. 1978); Ex parte Murray, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 130, 131 (Comm'r Pat. 1891).

⁷ Id.

⁸ See In re Sivertz, 227 USPQ 255, 256 (Comm'r Pat. 1985); see also In re Colombo, Inc., 33 USPQ2d 1530, 1532 (Comm'r Pat. 1994) (while the Office attempts to notify applicants of deficiencies in their responses in a manner permitting a timely correction, the Office has no obligation to notify parties of deficiencies in their responses in a manner permitting a timely correction).

unavoidable delay. As the showing presented is insufficient to establish unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 133 and 37 CFR 1.137(a). Thus, the petition will be dismissed.

ALTERNATIVE VENUE

Petitioners may wish to consider filing a renewed petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b),⁹ which now provides that where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b).

The filing of a petition under the unintentional standard cannot be intentionally delayed and therefore should be filed promptly. A person seeking revival due to unintentional delay cannot make a statement that the delay was unintentional unless the entire delay, including the delay from the date it was discovered that the application was abandoned until the filing of the petition to revive under 37 CFR 1.137(b), was unintentional. A statement that the delay was unintentional is not appropriate if petitioner intentionally delayed the filing of a petition for revival under 37 CFR 1.137(b).

A copy of the form for filing a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) to revive an application unintentionally abandoned is enclosed herewith for petitioner's convenience.

⁹ Effective December 1, 1997, the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) now provide that where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b). A grantable petition filed under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by:

(1) the required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In a nonprovisional utility or plant application filed on or after June 8, 1995, and abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may also be met by the filing of a request for continued examination in compliance with § 1.114. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof.

(2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(m);

(3) a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional. The Commissioner may require additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional; and

(4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c)).

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

By mail: Mail Stop Petition
 Commissioner for Patents
 P.O. Box 1450
 Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

By FAX: (571) 273-8300
 Attn: Office of Petitions

By hand: Customer Service Window
 Mail Stop Petition
 401 Dulany Street
 Alexandria, VA 22314

The fee for the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) will be charged to counsel's deposit account, No. 06-1130, as authorized in the present petition.

Telephone inquiries related to this decision should be directed to the undersigned at 571-272-3231.



Douglas I. Wood
Senior Petitions Attorney
Office of Petitions

Encl: PTO/SB/64
 Privacy Act Statement